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Alimony Deduction: Separated and Living Apart
While Sharing the Marital Home
I. INTRODUCTION
Two recent tax cases have pointed to an ambiguity in sections 71 and 215
of the Internal Revenue Code' about what constitutes separateness for pur-
poses of an alimony deduction. The ambiguity is whether a couple can be
separated while continuing to share the marital home. The outcome has an
important impact on the income tax laws because a determination under
section 71 that a couple can be separated while continuing to share the marital
home allows a payor spouse to deduct alimony support payments such as the
mortgage and utility bills of the residence in which they reside.2 The deduc-
tion benefits all spouses who pay alimony because the deduction is from gross
income, that is, the payor spouse does not have to itemize.' The importance
of allowing the payor spouse this benefit becomes apparent when one con-
siders that high unemployment and inflation cause some couples to continue
sharing the same residence although they are separated or are in the process
of obtaining a divorce, because the spouses are unable to afford separate
residences.
• - 4
The first case to deal with this issue was Sydnes v. Commissioner,
1. The pertinent provisions of I.R.C. § 71 (1967) and I.R.C. § 215 (1978) follow:
§ 71. ALIMONY AND SEPARATE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS
(a) GENERAL RULE.-
(1) DECREE OF DIVORCE OR SEPARATE MAINTENANCE.-If a wife is divorced or legally sep-
arated from her husband under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, the wife's gross income
includes periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received after such decree in
discharge of (or attributable to property transferred, in trust or otherwise, in discharge of) a legal
obligation which, because of the marital or family relationship, is imposed on or incurred by the
husband under the decree or under a written instrument incident to such divorce or separation.
(2) WRITfEN SEPARATION AGREEMENT.-If a wife is separated from her husband and there is a
written separation agreement executed after the date of the enactment of this title, the wife's gross
income includes periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received after such
agreement is executed which are made under such agreement and because of the marital or family
relationship (or which are attributable to property transferred, in trust or otherwise, under such
relationship). This paragraph shall not apply if the husband and wife make a single return jointly.
(3) DECREE FOR SUPPORT.-If a wife is separated from her husband, the wife's gross income
includes periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received by her after the date of
the enactment of this title from her husband under a decree entered after March 1, 1954, requiring the
husband to make the payments for her support or maintenance. This paragraph shall not apply if the
husband and wife make a single return jointly.
§ 215. ALIMONY, ETC., PAYMENTS
(a) GENERAL RULE.-In the case of a husband described in section 71, there shall be allowed as a
deduction amounts includible under section 71 in the gross income of his wife, payment of which is
made within the husband's taxable year. No deduction shall be allowed under the preceding sentence
with respect to any payment if, by reason of section 7 1(d) or 682, the amount thereof is not includible in
the husband's gross income.
2. See Sydnes v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'g in part and affg in part 68 T.C. 170
(1977); Washington v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 601 (1981).
3. See infra note 67. The spouses must file separate returns pursuant to § 71.
4. 577 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'g in part and affg in part 68 T.C. 170 (1977).
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decided by the Tax Court in 1977 and reversed by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1978. In Sydnes the Tax Court held that a husband and wife could
not be separated if they lived under the same roof, even though they did not
eat, sleep, or associate with each other.5 The court of appeals disagreed with
the Tax Court, holding that whether the parties were separated was a factual
issue that had been satisfactorily proved by the taxpayer
6
The second case was Washington v. Commissioner,7 which arose in the
Sixth Circuit and was decided in 1981 by the Tax Court. In Washington the
Tax Court confessed that what the term "separated" meant for purposes of
the alimony deduction was not entirely clear, but it did not agree with the
Eighth Circuit that a couple could be separated while sharing the same res-
idence.' It concluded that it would adhere to the rationale of its prior opinion
in Sydnes.9 However, in Washington three dissenting opinions challenged the
majority's reasoning.'t The dissenting judges contended that the majority's
strict interpretation of the statutes was not supported by the legislative history
and was not fair in light of present economic conditions."
The Tax Court in both cases determined that spouses cannot be sep-
arated while sharing the marital home, believing that duplication of expenses
was the motive behind Congress' enactment of the alimony deduction provi-
sion. 2 When a couple resides together, even without associating with each
other, there is no duplication of expenses. An examination of Congress' pur-
pose and intent reveals that Congress wanted to shift the burden of the tax
liability to the spouse who was better able to bear it-the payee spouse."
Congress did not mention the need for duplication of expenses. In addition,
the Tax Court considered the expenses incurred by the payor spouse toward
the mortgage and utility bills as the mere continuation of shared expenses.
4
This is not an accurate characterization of the purpose of support payments
made to a spouse. When one spouse pays the mortgage and utility bills for the
other spouse, that portion benefiting the payee spouse is not a shared ex-
pense, but a support payment. The payor spouse has an obligation that he or
she must satisfy according to a court order. Making the payor spouse pay tax
on income that he or she has not enjoyed and that is transferred to the other
spouse is precisely what Congress was trying to avoid. The payee spouse
must pay the tax on the income received.
5
5. 68 T.C. 170, 176 (1977).
6. 577 F.2d 60, 62 (8th Cir. 1978).
7. 77 T.C. 601 (1981).
8. Id. at 605.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 605-08. The dissenting opinions were written by Judge Fay, joined by Judge Wilbur and Judge
Nims; Judge Sterrett, joined by Judge Nims; and Judge Ekman, joined by Judge Tannenwald, Judge Irwin,
Judge Wilbur, and Judge Nims. Id.
11. Id. at 606-08.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 79-81.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 63-78.
14. See infra text accompanying note 81.
15. See infra text accompanying note 80.
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The Eighth Circuit in Sydnes developed a more plausible interpretation of
section 71 by stating that couples can be shown to be separated, as a factual
16
matter, while sharing the marital home. However, that court developed no
standards to assist the Internal Revenue Service and other courts in determin-
ing whether a couple was separated while sharing the marital home. Two state
domestic cases, Heckman v. Heckman 7 and Hurd v. Hurd,8 provide the
needed standards.' 9 These standards can justifiably be used in federal tax
cases to help fulfill Congress' intent to apply the alimony provision to those
couples who are truly separated.20 In addition, the standards eliminate the
possibility of sham separations.2
H. THE JuDicIAL HANDLING OF THE ISSUE-WHETHER A COUPLE CAN BE
SEPARATED WHILE SHARING THE MARITAL HoME
A. Sydnes v. Commissioner-Tax Court
In February 1971 Lugene, the wife, filed for dissolution of her marriage to
Richard, the petitioner in Sydnes. In March Lugene filed an application for
temporary alimony. On April 1, 1971, the Iowa District Court ordered Richard
to continue paying the usual family bills, including the home mortgage, taxes,
and groceries.22 The order provided that "during the time these proceedings
are being conducted the parties will continue to live separately but in the same
house. "2
From April 1 to July 9, 1971, Richard and Lugene continued to reside in
the family home, occupying separate bedrooms. Lugene kept her clothing and
personal items at the house and spent some time there every day. Lugene
rarely saw Richard and never ate meals with him during the separation. Dur-
ing this period Richard spent $1229.90 for Lugene's support, which reflected
one-half of the household expenses, $15 per week for food, and the total
amount of checks drawn by Lugene on the parties' joint bank account. On
July 9 the petition for dissolution was granted.24
Richard deducted the $1229.90 as temporary support pursuant to sections
71(a)(3) and 215. The Commissioner disallowed the alimony deduction be-
cause the parties were not separated, during the proceedings, within the
meaning of section 71(a)(3) since they lived in the same residence.2 The
Commissioner relied on section 1.71-1(b)(3)(i) of the Treasury regulations,
which provides that alimony is deductible when the spouses are "separated
16. See infra text accompanying notes 29-31.
17. 245 A.2d 550 (Del. 1968).
18. 179 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 84-107.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 108-15.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 112-15.
22. 68 T.C. 170, 171 (1977).
23. Id. at 172.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 172-73.
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and living apart.", 26 The Commissioner interpreted this regulation and section
71(a)(3) as requiring that a husband and wife live in separate residences for
27
alimony purposes.
The Tax Court in Sydnes affirmed the Commissioner's position that
"separated" means living in separate residences. The Tax Court stated,
The statutory history of the 1954 changes emphasizes that the factual status of
whether the parties are separated rather than their marital status under local law is
the key in determining whether amounts paid under a court order are includable in
the recipient's gross income and deductible by the payor.... We conclude that
"separated" as used in the statute and "separated" as used in the regulations
mean living in separate residences. Only when living in separate residences do the
parties incur the duplicate living expenses normally incurred by the divorced or
separated couples. In the absence of such duplication, and in the absence of any
legislative history cited to us which expressly elucidates what Congress intended,
we find it hard to believe that a mere continuation of shared living expenses
following estrangement was intended by Congress to generate a deduction when
the identical expenses would have been unavailable to the husband as a deduction
before the estrangement took place. Moreover, the Court should not be required
to delve into the intimate question of whether husband and wife are in fact living
28apart while residing in the same house.
B. Sydnes v. Commissioner-Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court,
disagreeing with the conclusion that under no facts or circumstances could a
husband and wife live separately in the same residence. 2 The court of appeals
noted that neither the statute nor the regulations specifically indicate that in
living separately or apart the parties cannot occupy separate quarters in the
same residence. 0 It held that whether the parties are living separately in the
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(3)(i) (1957) (emphasis added).
27. 68 T.C. 170, 174 (1977).
28. Id. at 175-76. See also S. REP. NO. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4621. Pertinent parts of the Senate Committee report are as follows:
(1) House changes accepted by committee:
Attention has been called to the fact that the present treatment discriminates against husbands and
wives who have separated although not under a court decree.
For this reason both the House bill and your committee's bill extend the tax treatment described
above to periodic payments made by a husband to his wife under a written separation agreement even
though they are not separated under a court decree if they are living apart and have not filed a joint
return for the taxable year.
(2) Changes made by committee:
... [I]t also provides that this treatment is to be applicable where a wife is separated from her
husband if she receives periodic payments from him under any type of decree (entered after the date of
enactment of this bill) requiring the husband to make payments for her support and maintenance.
Id. at 4639-40. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4017. Pertinent parts of the House Committee report are as follows:
Your committee's bill extends the tax treatment described above to periodic payments made by a
husband to his wife under a written separation agreement even though they are not separated under a
court decree if they are living apart and have not filed a joint return for the taxable year.
Id. at 4034.
29. 577 F.2d 60, 62 (8th Cir. 1978).
30. Id.
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same house can be proved as a factual matter, which the parties in Sydnes had
done."
C. Washington v. Commissioner-Tax Court
Washington closely parallels Sydnes. In April 1977 Alexander Washing-
ton, the petitioner, filed an action for divorce. In July Jean Washington,
Alexander's wife, filed a petition asking that Alexander be required to pay
the mortgage notes, utilities, maintenance, and other expenses during the
pendency of the divorce action. On August 1, 1977, the Michigan divorce
court entered an order requiring Alexander to pay all mortgage payments on
the residence as well as the gas, electric, and water bills?
32
From August 1, 1977, until their divorce in 1978, Alexander and Jean
continued to live in the same residence. They occupied separate bedrooms,
used separate bathrooms, prepared meals at different places, and did not eat
or talk with each other.33 Between August 1 and December 31, 1977, Alex-
ander paid $2185.18 for utility bills and mortgage payments. He deducted that
amount pursuant to sections 71(a)(3) and 215 on his 1977 income tax return.3
The Commissioner disallowed the deduction, reaffirming the Tax Court's
position in Sydnes that "separated" means living in separate residences.
35
The Tax Court conceded that if Alexander and Jean were separated when
the payments were made, the amounts qualified as alimony.36 It noted, how-
ever, that what the term "separated" means for purposes of the alimony
deduction is not entirely clear.37 In Washington the Tax Court disagreed with
the Eighth Circuit's Sydnes holding that separated and living apart may be
determined as a factual issue, even though the parties occupy the same res-
idence, provided they occupy separate quarters. 38 The Tax Court maintained
that, according to the legislative history accompanying the 1954 amendments
to section 71, Congress intended that a husband and wife should not be
treated as separate and living apart when both are living in the same resi-
dence. 9 The Tax Court concluded that it would adhere to the rationale of its
Sydnes opinion.
Seven judges, in three opinions, dissented from the reasoning of the
majority in Washington.4 ' They set forth five arguments why a couple can be
separated while sharing the marital home.
31. Id.
32. 77 T.C. 601, 602 (1981).
33. Id. at 602-03.
34. Id.
35. Brief for Respondent at 10, Washington v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 601 (1981).
36. 77 T.C. 601, 604 (1981).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 605. See supra text accompanying note 31.
39. 77 T.C. 601, 605 (1981). See supra note 28.
40. 77 T.C. 601, 605 (1981).
41. See supra note 10.
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First, Judge Fay noted in his dissent that section 71(a)(3), which requires
a spouse to be separated from the other spouse, is inconsistent with section
1.71-1(b)(3) of the Treasury regulations, which requires the spouses to be
separated and living apart 4 2 He concluded, however, that declaring section
1.71-1(b)(3) invalid was not proper for two reasons.43 His first reason was that
the legislative history shows that Congress thought living apart was part of
being separated.44 Judge Fay did not explain how he concluded this, other
than by reference to the legislative history of section 71. He stated that while
the statute, not its history, is the law, legislative history should not be ig-
nored.45 The second reason was that "separated and living apart" as used in
the regulations can be read consistent with the statute.46 Judge Fay noted that
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sydnes had held that spouses can live
apart and separately in the same residence.47 "[T]wo persons living on sep-
arate floors of the same house are living as separate and apart as two persons
occupying adjacent apartments.", 48
Second, Judge Fay pointed out that nowhere were duplicated expenses
required under section 71, as advocated by the majority.49 Section 71 does not
expressly or implicitly require a duplication of expenses as a prerequisite to
the deduction.50 Judge Fay therefore urged that the Tax Court could make no
inference about duplicated expenses when the statute does not establish such
a requirement.
Third, Judge Fay noted that neither section 71 nor the regulations there-
under deny an alimony deduction to divorced persons, even if they share the
same residence.5 Therefore, he concluded, it is not reasonable to deny a
similar deduction to separated persons, especially since neither the statutes
nor the regulations specifically prohibit it*
5 2
Fourth, Judge Fay stated that mere convenience for the court should not
be the reason for avoiding the issue whether a couple is separated 3 Although
Judge Sterrett recognized that allowing a deduction might involve difficult
evidential problems if the court had to delve into intimate questions about the
parties' relationship,54 he urged that a factual inquiry into this issue may not
be as cumbersome as the majority feared.55 For purposes of section 71(a)(3),
he suggested that a more reasonable approach, instead of handling the issue
42. 77 T.C. 601, 605-06 (1981) (Fay, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 606.
44. See supra note 28.
45. 77 T.C. 601, 606 (1981) (Fay, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. Id. See 577 F.2d 60, 62 (8th Cir. 1978).
48. 77 T.C. 601, 606 (1981) (Fay, J., dissenting).
49. Id. See supra text accompanying note 28.
50. See supra note 1.
51. 77 T.C. 601, 606 (1981) (Fay, J., dissenting).
52. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 108-10.
53. 77 T.C. 601, 606 (1981) (Fay, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 606-07 (Sterrett, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 607 (Sterrett, J., dissenting).
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on a case-by-case basis, would be to allow the state court issuing the decree
for support to determine whether a husband and wife are separated.56 He said
that a state court presumably would issue a decree for support only when the
parties are truly separated.57 He therefore believed that the state court's
determination on the decree for support can also be determinative of "sep-
arated" for purposes of 71(a)(3) 5 8 This approach would eliminate the need for
the court to examine every case to determine whether the spouses are actually
separated and living apart.59 Judge Sterrett justified this by saying, "Federal
courts long have superimposed Federal tax consequences on State determina-
tions of property rights. It seems equally appropriate to attach Federal conse-
quences to a State court determination of marital rights for such rights are
peculiarly within the jurisdiction of state courts to delineate." ' 60 Judge
Sterrett conceded that this approach would not eliminate the need for a fac-
tual inquiry into whether the parties are separated for purposes of section
7 l(a)(2) when the parties have a written separation agreement, but he felt that
it would help reduce the burden of determining the separate status as required
by section 71(a)(3).6
1
Fifth, Judge Ekman noted that economic conditions often make it im-
practicable for divorcing spouses to maintain separate residences.6z Thus, a
payor spouse should not be denied an alimony deduction merely because one
spouse cannot afford to live elsewhere during the pending divorce; otherwise,
the couple will be penalized for its financial status.
IH. THE MEANING OF SEPARATION FOR ALIMONY DEDUCTION PURPOSES
A. Examination of the Purpose of the Alimony Deduction-The History and
Background of Section 71
Prior to 1942 the Code contained no provision for alimony, on the theory
that alimony payments were personal expenses covered by the payor
spouse's personal exemption.63 By paying tax on his or her entire net income,
even though a large portion of the income might actually be paid to the other
spouse, the payor spouse experienced a hardship that was compounded with
the rise in graduated tax rates during the war years.64 Situations arose in
which the tax equalled or even exceeded the income left after paying
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59, Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The problem with this approach is that state courts determine whether a couple is separated in light
of state law. Thus, some states may hold that couples must be living in separate residences as a condition
precedent to obtaining a separation.
62. Id. at 608 (Ekman, J., dissenting).
63. 5 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 31A.01 (1980).
64. J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION Code Commentary at § 71:1 (1980).
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alimony.65 The hardship imposed on the payor spouse prompted Congress to
amend the 1939 Code in 1942 .66 The amendment provided that in computing
net income a deduction would be allowed for alimony or separate mainten-
ance payments included in the income of the recipient spouse.67
For a spouse to deduct alimony or support payments the 1942 amend-
ment required that the couple be divorced or legally separated under a decree
of divorce or separate maintenance. 6s The payments had to be periodic69 and
received pursuant to a legal obligation imposed by the court decree or by a
written instrument incident to the decree, and the legal obligation had to be
imposed because of the marital or family relationship. 70 A voluntary separa-
tion did not qualify for the alimony deduction; there had to be a decree of
separate maintenance issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.7'
The 1954 Code extended this principle to permit alimony deductions in
two other situations. Section 71(a)(2) allows a written separation agreement in
place of the court decree required in 71(a)(1). The written separation agree-
ment benefits spouses who have separated, but do not desire the publicity,
inconvenience, or expense of a court action.72 Section 71(a)(2) requires that
the spouses be separated when the payments are made and that payments be
pursuant to a written separation agreement executed after the enactment of
the 1954 Code. The other requirements are identical to those in section
71(a)(1). The provision is inapplicable, however, if the spouses file a joint
return.73
Section 71(a)(3) governs payments made under a court decree for sup-
port. The inclusion of support decrees in section 71 was intended to deal with
situations in which a spouse sues for support, but no decree of divorce or
separate maintenance is involved.74 The spouses need not be legally separated
or divorced under a court decree, and the support decree need not enforce a
65. H.R. REP. NO. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 46, reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 409.
66. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 120, 56 Stat. 798 (current version at I.R.C. § 215 (1978)).
67. Id. The 1942 Act provided for an itemized deduction to be taken from adjusted gross income. The Tax
Reform Act of 1976 changed the deduction from an itemized deduction to a deduction from gross income to
arrive at adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. § 62(13) (1982). Congress believes that it is more appropriate to take
the payment of alimony into account as a deduction in arriving at adjusted gross income, rather than as one of
the itemized deductions, which are generally limited to personal expenses. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXA-
TION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX REFORM ACTOF 1976, at 116 (Comm. Print
1976). As a result, the alimony deduction is now available to taxpayers even if they do not itemize their
deductions.
68. See supra note 1.
69. I.R.C. § 71(c) (1967) and Treas. "Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(1)-(3) (1957) state that payments are periodic when a
principal sum is paid in installments, provided that (1) the principal sum is paid over a period ending more than
10 years from the date of the agreement; or (2) the payments are subject to a contingency such as the death of
either spouse, remarriage of the wife, or change in the economic status of either spouse, and the payments are in
the nature of alimony or an allowance for support.
70. I.R.C. § 71(a)(1) (1967).
71. 5 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 31A.01 (1980).
72. J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION Code Commentary at § 71:3 (1980).
73. I.R.C. § 71(a)(2) (1967).
74. J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION Code Commentary at § 71:4 (1980).
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written separation agreement.7i Again, the spouses must be separated, file
separate returns, and meet the other requirements of section 71(a)(2).76
Congress recognized that the pre-1954 Code discriminated against hus-
bands and wives who separated without a court decree. Congress therefore
extended the alimony deduction to them.7 Congress also eliminated differ-
ences in divorce and separation policies among the states and established a
federal concept of what constitutes alimony for purposes of section 71.78
B. Analysis of the Tax Court's Holding in Sydnes and Washington
The Tax Court had two reasons for concluding that "separated" means
living in separate residences. First, the court stated that Congress did not
intend to allow an alimony deduction when no duplication of expenses had
occurred.79 The Tax Court took the wrong perspective. Section 71 does not
require that divorced or separated couples incur duplicate living expenses. In
allowing the payor spouse an alimony deduction, Congress intended to shift
the burden of paying the tax on alimony payments to the payee spouse.80 The
Tax Court stated that "a mere continuation of shared living expenses" did not
generate an alimony deduction sl but payments made by a payor spouse
toward the mortgage and utilities of a residence are support payments, not a
continuation of shared living expenses. The payor spouse is deprived of the
use of those payments and may not even have enough money left to rent an
apartment. Congress intended that such support payments be deductible by
the payor spouse through the enactment of section 71(a)(3).
The Tax Court's second reason for concluding that separated means
living in separate residences was that courts should not delve into the intimate
question whether the spouses are actually living apart while living in the same
residences.82 Judge Sterrett in his dissent noted that such a position fails to
recognize the unhappy realities of a disintegrating marriage and the difficult
economic constraints occasioned thereby 8 3 The majority did not explain why
courts should not delve into these intimate questions. This lack of reasoning
weakens the Tax Court's position on this issue.
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(3)(i) (1957).
76. I.R.C. § 71(a)(3) (1967); Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(3)(i) (1957).
77, See supra note 28.
78. L. PHILLIPS & W. HOFFMAN, WESTS FEDERAL TAXATION: INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES 110
(1981 ed.).
79. See supra text accompanying note 28.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
81. See supra text accompanying note 28.
82. Id.
83. 77 T.C. 601, 607 (1981) (Sterrett, J., dissenting).
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C. State Domestic Courts' Handling of Living Separate and Apart While
Sharing the Marital Home
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals said that whether the parties are
living separately in the same house can be determined as a factual matter.84
Unfortunately, the court did not establish guidelines for determining whether
parties are separated while sharing the marital home, nor were any offered by
the dissenting judges in Washington. Although Sydnes and Washington failed
to provide guidelines, Judge Sterrett did say that a state court presumably
would issue a decree for support only when the parties are truly separated.8
5
State court divorce actions have examined the meaning of "separate and
living apart" and provide a framework for identifying the characteristics of
"separated" for tax purposes.
A general definition of separation as a ground for divorce is that a phys-
ical separation of the parties has occurred, with the intent of severing the
marital status or of not resuming marital relations.8 6 This definition is not
totally satisfactory because it does not define what is meant by physical
separation. An additional requirement is that the parties must not have any
reasonable expectation of reconciliation.87
Two state cases help define what is meant by separation and physical
separation. Heckman v. Heckman8 was a divorce action following a volun-
tary separation.8 9 In Heckman the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the
lower court's holding that the statutory requirement of living separately and
apart was not met unless the parties lived in different dwellings.90 The su-
preme court acknowledged that several cases had upheld the requirement of
separate residences, but noted that in a number of them only the sexual
relationship had been severed.9' It followed the reasoning of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Hurd v. Hurd92 and Boyce v. Boyce,93
which granted divorce decrees even though both parties were living in the
84. See supra text accompanying note 31.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
86. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 148 (1966).
87. Id.
88. 245 A.2d 550 (Del. 1968).
89. The statute on which the action was based read as follows:
The causes for divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall be:
(11) When husband and wife have voluntarily lived separate and apart, without any cohabitation for
three consecutive years prior to the filing of the divorce action and such separation is beyond any
reasonable expectation of reconciliation.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1522(11) (1957) (current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1503(7) (1981)). The
current Delaware statute allows a separation if the parties live separately and apart for at least six months, even
if the parties reside in the same house, as long as they "occupy separate bedrooms and do not have sexual
relations with each other." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1503(7) (1981).
90. 245 A.2d 550, 551 (Del. 1968).
91. Id. See Annot., 51 A.L.R. 768 (1927), and Annot., 166 A.L.R. 508 (1947), for a list of the cases to which
the court referred.
92. 179 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
93. 153 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
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same residence, because the "essential thing is not separate roofs, but sep-
arate lives." 94
Commenting on the policy of voluntary separation in Delaware, the court
indicated that the state should not compel the continuance of a marital rela-
tionship between unwilling parties. This approach contrasted with the former
domestic policy of allowing separation only upon certain grounds such as
adultery or abuse.?5 Delaware recognizes that when a husband and wife have
lived apart for a time, without any intention of resuming conjugal relations,
the best interests of society and of the parties will be promoted by a dissolu-
tion of the marriage.96 The court held that this policy was not violated by a
finding of voluntary separation under the Delaware statutes, even though the
parties continued to reside in the same residence, when all other incidents of
the marriage have been mutually abandoned.97
The Heckman court pointed out that economic necessity and stubborn-
ness may compel spouses to remain in the same dwelling after marital rela-
tions have ended.98 The parties may be unable to afford to live separately, or
may be trying to gain a favorable position for possession of the house and its
contents.
Hurd v. Hurd'0° involved facts similar to those in Heckman in an action
brought by the wife for support following voluntary separation. Because the
husband was unable to get a room due to the scarcity of housing in Washing-
ton in 1941, and because he could contribute more money for the support of
their infant by living at home, the husband and wife agreed that he could
occupy a room in the wife's house. There was no social interaction between
them, nor did the husband eat meals in the house after their separation.'I ' The
trial court refused to grant a decree because even though marital relations had
ceased, living in the same house evidenced estrangement rather than separa-
tion. The trial court based its denial on the parties' occupancy of adjacent
bedrooms.'02 The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that a
spouse during a legal separation is not required to live in a different resi-
dence. 0 3 Separate lives are essential, not separate roofs.' 4 If the parties
abandon the relations of husband and wife in all but the most technical legal
sense, they are for all purposes separated.'05 The Hurd court felt that the
parties were separated as effectively as if they were living in separate resi-
94. 245 A.2d 550, 551 (Del. 1968).
95. Id. (citing 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 303 (1966)).
96. 245 A.2d 550, 551 (Del. 1968).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 179 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
101. Id. at 68--69.
102. Id. at 69.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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dences.' 6 This voluntary separation should permit the legal termination of a
marriage that has ceased to exist in fact.'07
The key to the construction of "separated and living apart" in these state
domestic cases is the parties' abandonment of the incidents of marriage by
breaking sexual and social ties. In addition, the parties must have no intent to
resume conjugal relations. The Heckman and Hurd courts recognized that
separation entails more than physical distance between the spouses. In addi-
tion, they recognized that there are valid reasons for sharing the same res-
idence, such as economic necessity and stubbornness.
Spouses can live separately and apart while sharing the same residence.
The question remains whether the meaning given to "separate and living
apart" in state court divorce actions can apply to section 71.
D. Separation for Alimony Purposes Can Mean Separated While Sharing the
Marital Home: Proposed Standards
As the Tax Court majority stated in Washington, what "separated"
means for purposes of the alimony deduction is not clear.'08 What is clear,
though, is that the statute, regulations, and legislative history do not say that a
couple cannot live separately and apart in the same residence. In Washington
Judge Fay observed that if the spouses are divorced or legally separated under
a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, payments that have met the
other requirements of section 71(a)(1) will be deductible even if the parties
still share the marital home.'09 Congress added sections 71(a)(2) and 71(a)(3)
to eliminate the discrimination against those who were separated without
benefit of a court order."0 Congress did not intend for separated parties to
meet an additional requirement of living in separate residences. If this were
required, Congress would be imposing a stricter requirement, contrary to the
purpose stated in the legislative history accompanying the 1954 amendments.
Moreover, the meaning given to "separate and living apart" by the
Heckman and Hurd courts supports congressional intent to treat those living
in the same residence like those not sharing a residence. Congress wanted to
shift the burden of the tax on alimony payments to the party better able to
bear it-the payee spouse."' A determination whether the payor spouse qual-
ifies for an alimony deduction is usually clear because both spouses normally
will live in separate residences, and because the payments are for the support
of the other spouse. Economic conditions have made it difficult for many
couples to meet their living expenses, resulting in decisions by separated
106. Id.
107. See also Hawkins v. Hawkins, 191 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Boyce v. Boyce, 153 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir.
1946).
108. 77 T.C. 601, 604 (1981).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52. There are no reported cases in which this situation has
occurred.
110. See supra note 28.
11I. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
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spouses to continue sharing the marital home until one spouse is financially
capable of moving out.
The Tax Court in Sydnes and Washington believed that duplicated ex-
penses were necessary in allowing alimony deductions."2 Although the court
did not substantiate this conclusion, its main concern may have been that
allowing a couple to share a home while legally separated might lead to many
sham separations, in which couples would claim to be separated to obtain the
alimony deduction. Any advantage gained by this ploy would be illusory
because, while the payor spouse deducts the alimony, the payee spouse in-
cludes it in income. Although this method could be used to shift income from
a high-bracket taxpayer to a low-bracket payee spouse, the scheme would not
succeed if the court looked to the facts, as suggested by the Eighth Circuit in
Sydnes, to determine whether the couple is truly separated.
1 3
No standards currently exist for determining whether a couple is
truly separated for alimony deduction purposes. However, Heckman and
Hurd can provide the necessary standards. The Internal Revenue Service and
the courts should determine whether the parties (1) have abandoned the in-
cidents of marriage, (2) have an intent to resume conjugal relations, and (3)
have a valid reason for sharing the same residence.
These standards, taken from Heckman and Hurd, should apply to the tax
laws because "separated and living apart" is ambiguous. Congress gave no
indication of what it meant by the term in the Code or legislative history. It
was attempting, however, to equalize the divorce and separation policies
among the states by establishing a federal concept of what constituted al-
imony for purposes of section 71."1 Congress recognized that some states had
liberalized their divorce policies by allowing couples to separate by a volun-
tary and mutual agreement. The pre-1954 Code did not allow an alimony
deduction to a payor spouse in a voluntary separation, so Congress amended
the Code to avoid discriminating against this spouse. Believing that separation
entails more than physical distance, state domestic courts have determined
that spouses can be separated while sharing the marital home. Therefore,
when one spouse must pay support to the other spouse, the payment consti-
tutes an obligation and not a "mere continuation of shared living expenses"
as defined by the Tax Court."5 Congress has not expressly foreclosed this
view. It intended that support payments be deductible pursuant to section 71.
Therefore, when Congress extended section 71 in 1954 to encompass separa-
tion agreements, it wanted to allow the alimony provision to apply to spouses
who were separated. It did not make duplication of expenses or separate
residences prerequisites to obtaining the deduction. The standards taken from
Heckman and Hurd do not violate the intent of Congress in amending the
Code.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 28 and 40.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
115. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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E. Application of Proposed Standards to Washington
The petitioner in Washington did not appeal.' 6 What is the result if the
standards taken from Heckman and Hurd are applied to Washington? It is
arguable that all incidents of marriage had been abandoned, because Jean and
Alexander had separate bedrooms, prepared meals at different places, did not
talk to each other, and did not do anything that a married couple might do.
This abandonment was reinforced by their intent not to resume conjugal
relations, which was adequately illustrated by their involvement in predivorce
proceedings. Finally, although the facts are not clear why the parties shared
the residence, there are two possible indications. Alexander said that he had
been ordered by the state court to make support payments to Jean or be
arrested, even though he was poor.'17 Also, Alexander argued the case pro
se."' Alexander apparently did not have enough money to hire counsel, nor
after paying support to Jean did he have enough money to move to another
residence.
Therefore, it should be concluded that Alexander and Jean were separat-
ed for alimony purposes. Conceivably, Alexander did not have enough money
to pay the additional tax since he had given money to Jean as support. This
situation is what prompted Congress to enact the alimony deduction and to
shift the tax to the party better able to pay it-the payee spouse.
Courts should recognize separateness for what it really is and should not
penalize truly separated couples who must share the marital home for ex-
tenuating reasons.
William A. Leuby
116. Washington originated in Michigan. Michigan later amended its statute concerning grounds for
divorce to the present version cited below. No domestic case challenging this statute has come before the Sixth
Circuit to show how receptive the court would be to allowing a couple to be separated while sharing the marital
home. Although the issue here concerns federal tax law, the Sixth Circuit may be more receptive to the
proposed standards in light of Michigan's statute, which parallels the theories outlined in this Note.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.6 (1982) provides:
(1) A complaint for divorce may be filed in the circuit court upon the allegation that there has been a
breakdown of the marriage relationship to the extent that the objects of matrimony have been destroy-
ed and there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved. In the complaint the
plaintiff shall make no other explanation of the grounds for divorce than by the use of statutory
language.
(2) The defendant, by answer, may either admit the grounds for divorce alleged or deny them without
further explanation. An admission by the defendant of the grounds for divorce may be considered by
the court but is not binding on the court's determination.
(3) The court shall enter ajudgment dissolving the bonds of matrimony if evidence is presented in open
court that there has been a breakdown in the marriage relationship to the extent that the objects of
matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be
preserved.
117. Petition to the Tax Court, Addendum, Washington v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 601 (1981).
118. Id.
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